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1. Introduction
Armed conflict is destructive in various ways. The first and obvious impact of war is that it kills and 
injures people: Between 1945 and 1999 an estimated 3.3 million people got killed in 25 interstate wars, 
and 16.2 million in 127 civil wars (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Diseases and other indirect effects more 
than double this death toll (Ghobarah et al., 2003).  
Also the economic consequences of war are very substantial: According to Collier (2007), civil wars 
reduce economic growth on average by 2.3 percent per year, and the average civil war lowers GDP by 
about 15 percent (when comparing the first year after conflict with the last year before conflict), while 
the direct and indirect costs of an average civil war can be estimated at around $ 64 billion.  
On top of this, substantial evidence shows that –unsurprisingly– conflict harms physical and mental 
health (see e.g. Barenbaum et al., 2004) and that it deteriorates schooling and long-run educational 
outcomes (see e.g. Shemyakina, 2011). Finally, there is a lively debate on the social impact of war, with 
some papers finding that conflict reduces inter-group trust (Rohner et al., 2013), and makes war victims 
more likely to engage in crime or conflict later in life (Couttenier et al., 2016), while other work finds 
conflict to boost local collective action (see the survey of Bauer et al., 2016). It has also been 
documented that a country exposed to conflict today is more likely to experience it also in the future, 
which may magnify the costs of conflict breaking out.2  
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Given this multi-dimensional and by any means substantial effect of war on society, it is crucial to 
understand the underlying drivers of conflict.3 One factor that has been singled out as a main 
determinant of conflict behavior has been the abundance of natural resources, which is the topic of the 
current contribution.4 In particular, this article aims to provide a well-structured synthesis of the 
theoretical and empirical literature linking natural resources to conflict.5 
From a conceptual perspective, a rich theoretical literature has identified several major channels 
through which natural resources magnify the risk of civil conflict. First, the presence of natural resources 
increases the ``prize'' that can be seized through the capture of the territory or the state -- which has 
been referred to as “greed” or “rent-seeking”. Second, natural resources make rebellion more feasible 
and longer lasting, i.e. looting and extortion relax financing constraints and make it easier to set up and 
sustain a rebel movement. Third, weak state capacity and extractive institutions may be a further 
consequence of resource wealth: Rentier states can rely on resource rents and do not build enough 
state capacity and good institutions, which makes them less effective in counterinsurgency and 
eventually more instable. Fourth, given that natural resource production is capital intensive, a resource 
price increase will boost capital-intensive production, and shrink labor-intensive sectors, which frees up 
cheap labor for rebellion. Fifth, when the territorial distribution of natural resources is unequal, 
resource-rich minority regions may have incentives to fight for secession. Sixth, the inter-temporal 
incentives for committing mass killings are fostered by large natural resource holdings. Finally, natural 
resources can in addition exacerbate grievances, due to frustrations from environmental degradation or 
banned access to lucrative mining jobs.  
Finally, it is important to also point out that in principle there could well also exist mechanisms through 
which natural resource abundance lowers the conflict risk, as discussed in more detail below.The 
empirical literature on the conflict-resources nexus is also manifold. After the pioneering contributions 
establishing the stylized correlation, the literature has focused on i) finding more accurate measures of 
resource abundance, and ii) putting in place a more convincing identification strategy. The most recent 
trend has been to use very fine-grained geo-referenced micro-data, allowing to connect the empirics to 
the theory and to gain further insights on the mechanism and channels at work. 
The current contribution is structured as follows: In Section 2 we shall discuss – one by one– the main 
theoretical channels linking natural resources to conflict highlighted in the existing literature, while 
Section 3 is dedicated to an account of recent empirical advances. Section 4 concludes. 
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2. The Theoretical Mechanisms 
2.1 The Prize / Rent-seeking Effect 
One of the main channels of the resource-conflict nexus focused upon by scholars is that the presence 
of natural resources increases the ``prize'' (or “cake”) that is up for grab. Put bluntly, if nothing can be 
stolen, there is not much point in fighting, while higher rewards attract higher fighting effort. This effect 
can easily be spotted in a typical “rent-seeking” conflict model using contest success functions. Consider 





where 𝜋𝑖=payoff function of player i (the one for j is analogous), 𝑅=natural resource rents, 𝑓𝑖=fighting 
effort of i, 𝑓𝑗=fighting effort of j, c=cost parameter of fighting effort.  
In such a standard simplified workhorse model the Nash Equilibrium is given by 𝑓𝑖
∗ = 𝑓𝑗
∗ = 𝑅/(4𝑐), 
implying that equilibrium fighting efforts are an increasing function of natural resource rents R. 
Such a logic of natural resource wealth boosting rent-seeking incentives has for example been applied in 
the models of Reuveny and Maxwell (2001), Grossman and Mendoza (2003), Hodler (2006), van der 
Ploeg and Rohner (2012), Caselli and Coleman (2013) and van der Ploeg (2017). 
2.2 Relaxing financing constraints of rebellion 
Take the workhorse model described in section 2.1 above, but assume that there is some fixed cost 
lump sum weaponry investment required to have positive fighting strength, i.e. take the formula of 
above but have now 𝑓𝑖  denote actual fighting strength and introduce fighting effort 𝑒𝑖, where 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 if 
𝑒𝑖 ≥ ?̅?, while 𝑓𝑖 = 0 if 𝑒𝑖 < ?̅?. If wanna-be rebel leaders in such a setting are cash constrained, then the 
access to valuable natural resources can relax their cash constraints and make them able to reach the 
minimum fighting effort threshold to build an army.  
In the literature it has indeed been found that natural resources make rebellion more feasible and 
enable rebels to sustain their armed opposition over a longer time period (Fearon, 2004; Collier, 
Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009; Berman et al., 2017). In particular, it has also been found that capturing a 
mineral extraction area results in a given rebel group expanding their zone of fighting in the next period 
(Berman et al., 2017). 
2.3 Weak state capacity 
A state that does not have to raise taxes to assure its functioning but can instead rely mostly on natural 
resource rents has lower incentives to build up fiscal capacity in particular and state capacity in general. 
While the effects of having such a weak state apparatus are not immediately noticeable in the middle of 
the natural resource boom, they typically have a negative impact on the state’s capability to persist 
during crises, leading to political instability. This mechanism has among others been studied by Fearon 
(2005), Besley and Persson (2011) and Bell and Wolford (2015). 
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Natural resource wealth has also been observed to fuel corruption and populism, which is an additional 
force driving down the efficiency of the state administration (see e.g. Baland and Francois, 2000; Ross 
2012; Caselli and Michaels 2013; and Matsen et al., 2017). 
2.4 Capital intensiveness of natural resource extraction 
Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2011) include an appropriation sector in a general equilibrium model with as factors 
of production capital and labor. Assuming that appropriation is relatively labor intensive, they show that 
a price boom in the capital intensive natural resource sector soaks up capital from the other sectors, 
which lead to a drop in wages and hence reduced opportunity costs of appropriation, boosting conflict. 
This is in line with the findings of Dube and Vargas (2013) for oil and coffee in Columbia.  
2.5 Resource inequality and conflict 
The dangerous effects of natural resources abundance on rent-seeking, financing of fighting and state 
capacity can be exacerbated in the presence of existing ethnic divisions and inequalities. If a major 
resource producer is ethnically relatively homogenous (think of Norway) or resources are distributed 
rather evenly in the territory (think of the Gulf states), it is easier to contain the destructive forces of a 
potential resource curse than if resources are concentrated in a given region of an ethnically divided 
country. Things get worse still if the oil rich region coincides with the homelands of an ethnic or religious 
minority group (Morelli and Rohner, 2015). In this scenario the resource-rich minority group has 
powerful incentives to seek secession, as illustrated by the separatist movements in Aceh (Indonesia), 
Timor-Leste (ex-Indonesia), the Niger-Delta (Nigeria), South Sudan, Yemen, or Kurdistan (Iraq), among 
many others. 
A similar logic of resource asymmetry fueling conflict applies as well to inter-state interactions. Caselli et 
al. (2015) make the following point: If two countries in a dyad have similar resource holdings, what they 
can gain in war is similar to what they can lose. However, if one country has larger resource deposits 
than the other it constitutes an attractive prey for the resource-poor opponent who itself has less to 
lose from war. The incentives for attacking are magnified further when the resources are close to the 
bilateral border, as relatively modest territorial gains can allow the resource-poor attacker to grab the 
loot. 
2.6 Mass Killings of Civilians 
Esteban et al. (2015) point out that the presence of large natural resource deposits may increase a 
cynical government’s incentives to turn its arms against its own people. In their dynamic model, the 
government is able to eliminate (by killings or displacements) a part of the opposition population group. 
What it gains is a higher chance of being able to grab a larger share of the country’s rents in the long-
run, while of course a smaller population means less rents to be grabbed. And this “shrinking pie” effect 
is shown to be larger the bigger the importance of productive labor in the economic output. In 
particular, it is shown that in a country with very few natural resources it is usually not worthwhile –
even for the most cynical government—to reduce its opposition size, as the gain in the share of the 
“pie” is dominated by the loss due to the “pie” becoming smaller. In contrast, in a petro-state where 
much of economic output can be produced independently of the size of the local population, the cruel 
calculations of cynical leaders may tilt towards mass killings of opposition minorities. 
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2.7 Grievances by local population 
There is also a literature stressing that local social tensions can be fueled by the fact that often the local 
population loses out as far as resource production is concerned. While it suffers from environmental 
degradation it often only reaps a slim share of the economic benefits in terms of e.g. job opportunities. 
Contributions focusing on this include Le Billon (2001), Ross (2004), and Humphreys (2005). The “rough” 
environments created in mining towns can also result in a persistent, general rise in crime and 
homicides, as found by Couttenier et al. (2017). In line with this channel, it has been found that the 
conflict risk is magnified in mining areas where the exploiting firm has bad corporate governance 
records (Berman et al., 2017). 
2.8 Potential beneficial effects of resource wealth reducing the scope of 
conflict 
In terms of theoretical channels, one could well think that the presence of natural resources could 
reduce the scope of war by for example making redistribution easier to finance, or by providing 
employment opportunities to the local population, thereby increasing the opportunity cost of fighting. 
The trade-off is then that on the one hand the presence of valuable resources increases the gains of 
rebellion, while on the other hand the better job market prospects increase the opportunity cost of 
fighting. One factor limiting the relevance of this opportunity cost channel is the fact that resource 
extraction is relatively capital-intensive (as discussed above under section 2.4) and makes use of very 
specialized staff, which implies that often local labor is of limited importance and the boost provided for 
the local economy is relatively modest.  
Empirically speaking, while there are indeed instances where oil wealth has arguably helped to “buy off” 
popular discontent (like recently in certain Gulf states during the Arab Spring), there does not exist 
compelling, large-scale evidence of this conflict-reducing effect of valuable resources. Angrist and Kugler 
(2008), for example, find hardly any substantial, positive effects of Coca production in Columbia on the 
local economy. 
Going beyond the direct effects of local employment opportunities and short-run chances for buying-off 
popular discontent, one can also make the more general point that—at least potentially—natural 
resource abundance could foster long-run economic development which is a major factor contributing 
to political stability (see e.g. Collier et al., 2009). Whether natural resources can indeed contribute 
indirectly to peace by fostering long-run development very much depends on institutions, which is 
central to the positive or negative effects resource abundance has on economic performance (Mehlum 
et al., 2006; Clay, 2011).  
Positive effects of natural resources on economic performance have for example be detected for 
countries with strong institutions such as the United States or Botswana. For instance, Wright and 
Czelusta (2007) have shown how, in the United States, resource and, in particular, coal abundance has 
led to the establishment of a number of major educational institutions and knowledge for other sectors 
of the economy. In the same vain, Hillbom (2015) shows that in Botswana natural resource wealth has 
favored a good economic record (although at the cost of specialization dependence). The potential 
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growth effects of natural resources –if well managed—could indeed in principle reduce the scope for 
conflict.  
3. Recent empirical findings 
Below we shall discuss recent empirical results in the literature, discussing also in some depth the 
econometric approaches used. While some of these empirical studies can be linked to the theoretical 
mechanisms outlined above, in quite many cases the empirical results are bound to link resources to 
conflict without highlighting the particular channels at work. 
The pioneering empirical contributions linking natural resource abundance to conflict (see e.g. Fearon 
and Laitin, 2003; and Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) have studied the overall impact of natural resources in 
general on conflict using pooled country-year level panels, finding indeed a positive association between 
resource wealth and conflict. From this starting point onwards, the literature has moved from more 
general to more specific, as far as both the types of natural resources studied, as well as the level of 
geographical aggregation is concerned. 
3.1 Types of natural resources 
In terms of resources studied, the one resource that has been found to be particularly dangerous for 
political stability is oil (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Fearon, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Ross, 2006, 2012). The 
most recent country-year level studies linking oil to civil conflict have put emphasis on the need to 
control for country fixed effects. Doing so, Cotet and Tsui (2013) do not find a robust impact of oil 
reserves on civil conflict, while Lei and Michaels (2014) find oil discoveries to boost the risk of civil wars. 
Using geographically disaggregate data, Dube and Vargas (2013) find positive oil price shocks to increase 
violence in Columbia, while Morelli and Rohner (2015) find that increases in oil inequality within a 
country lead to more fighting. 
Another resource having been found to increase the risk of civil war are diamonds (Lujala et al., 2005; 
Humphreys, 2005; Ross, 2006, Olsson, 2007; and Lujala, 2010). Similarly, at a cell-level Berman et al. 
(2017) find that price increases for particular minerals increase armed conflict events in areas producing 
these minerals.  
Finally, it has been found that the production of narcotics tends to rise the scope for conflict (Angrist 
and Kugler, 2008; Lujala, 2009; Mejia and Restrepo, 2015).  
Interestingly, and in line with the feasibility of conflict channel discussed under section 2.2, lootable 
resources like alluvial gemstones, other minerals, narcotics and timber also tend to sustain, spread and 
prolong war effort during conflict (Fearon, 2004; Ross, 2006; Lujala, 2010; Berman et al., 2017). As such 
resources can more easily be appropriated by local rebel groups, they may indeed play a key role in 
rebel financing. 
3.2 Focusing on shocks and using disaggregate data 
In the quest of improving the identification strategy for studying the resources-conflict nexus there have 
been two broad trends in the literature, namely the focus on price or discovery shocks, as well as the 
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use of more disaggregate data at the ethnic group or cell level, allowing to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity at the very local level, for example by the inclusion of cell fixed effects and country-year 
fixed effects.  
As far as shocks are concerned, trade and commodity price shocks related to natural resources have 
indeed been found to increase the risk of conflict in some instances (Ross, 2006; Brückner and Ciccone, 
2010; Besley and Persson, 2011; Dube and Vargas, 2013; Bazzi and Blattman, 2013; Berman et al., 2017). 
Also the use of disaggregate data has become increasingly popular, with articles using such data 
including for example Angrist and Kugler (2008), Dube and Vargas (2013), Aragon and Rud (2013), 
Morelli and Rohner (2015), Esteban et al. (2015), Berman et al. (2017), and Sanchez de la Sierra (2017).  
4. Conclusion – How to Break the Conflict-Related Resource Curse?  
As pointed out above, there is on the whole convincing evidence that—at least in recent decades—
natural resource abundance is rather a detrimental than beneficial force for peace. A variety of channels 
link resource rents to the incentives of conflict, and various types of natural resources are susceptible to 
fuel war. 
The above account is somewhat gloomy—to say the least. Are we doomed to be in a world where 
mother nature’s riches create chaos and turmoil rather than wealth and prosperity? While curbing the 
conflict trap is not easy, there are some promising avenues for policies for peace.  
First of all, it is important to keep in mind that the studies relating conflict to natural resource 
abundance draw on post-World War II data, and that their gloomy findings contrast considerably with 
historical case studies where resource abundance could be an engine of growth without spreading civil 
conflict, such as for example the case of coal in the United States or in Europe during Industrialisation 
(see the discussion under section 2.8). What these historical success stories, as well as current ones such 
as Norway or Botswana, have in common is that they have occurred in countries with strong state 
capacity and reliable institutions. As shown by Mehlum et al. (2006), the negative effects of natural 
resources only predominate if institutions are of a poor quality. Norway’s oil, for example, indeed has a 
rather beneficial impact, by fueling the Sovereign Wealth Fund, contrasting sharply with the detrimental 
effects in numerous other countries. 
Second, transparency and good corporate governance matter. Berman et al. (2017) find that the 
negative effects of mining price surges can be partially attenuated if transparency initiatives limit illegal 
trading and in situations where the mining firms involved have good social responsibility records. 
Third, channeling the natural resource manna from heaven into education is promising. De la Brière et 
al. (2017) and Rohner (2017) show that indeed in many situations investing resource wealth in human 
capital can foster future growth and reduce distributional conflicts.  
While these three avenues may be auspicious, the relative scarcity of recent contributions proposing 
solutions to break the conflict-related resource curse suggests that there is still much further scope for 
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studying which policies may turn natural resources into an engine for growth without increasing the risk 
of conflict. A challenging, yet important step consists in understanding in more depth the contrast 
between the recent literature on conflict finding in general harmful effects of natural resources and the 
literature in economic history finding that resource abundance has in several cases played a positive 
role. Future research focusing on the contexts, institutional arrangements, and policy environments in 
which resource abundance can be a blessing is very much encouraged.  
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